Análisis realizado por : Bren Matthew Ebriega   
 Alias

HEUR:Trojan.Win64.Miner.vho (KASPERSKY); W32/Agent.ED58!tr (FORTINET)

 Plataforma:

Windows

 Riesgo general:
 Potencial de destrucción:
 Potencial de distribución:
 Infección divulgada:
 Revelación de la información:
Bajo
Medio
High
Crítico

  • Tipo de malware
    Trojan

  • Destructivo?
    No

  • Cifrado
    No

  • In the Wild:
    Sí

  Resumen y descripción

Canal de infección Descargado de Internet, Eliminado por otro tipo de malware

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

  Detalles técnicos

Tamaño del archivo 2,258,408 bytes
Tipo de archivo EXE
Residente en memoria Sí
Fecha de recepción de las muestras iniciales 27 Nov 2020
Carga útil Drops files, Connects to URLs/IPs

Detalles de entrada

It arrives on a system as a file dropped by other malware or as a file downloaded unknowingly by users when visiting malicious sites.

Instalación

Crea las siguientes copias de sí mismo en el sistema afectado:

  • %System%\{String Name}.exe - where String Name can be any of the following:
    • about
    • account
    • activities
    • administration
    • advertised
    • along
    • always
    • areas
    • around
    • attend
    • because
    • become
    • besides
    • both
    • capacity
    • ceremony
    • change
    • cloud
    • collecting
    • command
    • compromised
    • computer
    • constructive
    • consultants
    • cooperation
    • coverage
    • crime
    • crowded
    • cultural
    • culture
    • development
    • digital
    • disable
    • disaster
    • Dongpo
    • during
    • energy
    • ensure
    • escalated
    • even
    • Even
    • event
    • Falcon
    • featuring
    • festivals
    • figure
    • financial
    • firewalls
    • First
    • first
    • former
    • forum
    • found
    • from
    • gotten
    • governments
    • historical
    • hotbed
    • imagine
    • improve
    • inadequate
    • information
    • innovation
    • installed
    • international
    • learn
    • legendary
    • line
    • machine
    • management
    • manager
    • may
    • Meanwhile
    • memorial
    • more
    • needtemporarily
    • neglect
    • notice
    • obvious
    • often
    • opening
    • past
    • people
    • performances
    • poverty
    • pretty
    • prevention
    • product
    • products
    • programs
    • proper
    • provided
    • quality
    • quickly
    • realize
    • recently
    • recorded
    • related
    • residence
    • response
    • result
    • routes
    • running
    • sanitation
    • scenario
    • scientific
    • Sensor
    • sensor
    • services
    • silently
    • sites
    • skeptical
    • Slums
    • slums
    • special
    • strengthening
    • such
    • suffer
    • suggestions
    • sure
    • sustainable
    • technological
    • temple
    • there
    • those
    • thought
    • through
    • tintr
    • tools
    • tourist
    • transformation
    • turn
    • turned
    • turning
    • uninstall
    • unwilling
    • visit
    • watch
    • when
    • which
    • your
    • yourself

(Nota: %System% es la carpeta del sistema de Windows, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar en C:\Windows\System, en el caso de Windows NT y 2000 en C:\WINNT\System32 y en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Windows\System32).

)

Infiltra los archivos siguientes:

  • %System%\wostmp\{random numbers} → copy of original malware
  • %System%\LogFiles\normaliz.dll
  • %System%\LogFiles\micsoboeh.exe → detected as Coinminer.Win32.MALXMR.TIAOODFG
  • %System%\LogFiles\rubescuritys.exe → detected as Coinminer.Win32.MALXMR.TDQ
  • %Windows%\Swil\prologs
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\ds\{Hash} → detected as TROJ_GEN.R002C0PKB20
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\gt\{Hash} → detected as TROJ_GEN.R002C0PKB20
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\ds\{Hash} → detected as Coinminer.Win32.MALXMR.TIAOODFG
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\gt\{Hash} → detected as Coinminer.Win32.MALXMR.TIAOODFG
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\ds\{Hash} → detected as Coinminer.Win64.MALXMR.FAILA (When ran in 64bit environment)
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\gt\{Hash} → detected as Coinminer.Win64.MALXMR.FAILA (When ran in 64bit environment)

(Nota: %System% es la carpeta del sistema de Windows, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar en C:\Windows\System, en el caso de Windows NT y 2000 en C:\WINNT\System32 y en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Windows\System32).

. %Windows% es la carpeta de Windows, que suele estar en C:\Windows o C:\WINNT).

)

Agrega los procesos siguientes:

  • %System%\{String Name}.exe {Service Name}
  • %System%\LogFiles\micsoboeh.exe allbit32 wxp|w2003 mwrite:0 ewrite:0 twrite:0 size:0 newrun:1 flag:2 c:3 stopwork:nope "{Malware Defined Strings}"
  • %System%\LogFiles\micsoboeh.exe all_i_bit32 wxp|w2003 mwrite:0 ewrite:0 twrite:0 size:0 newrun:1 flag:2 c:3 stopwork:nope "{Malware Defined Strings}"
  • %System%\LogFiles\rubescuritys.exe -a yespowersugar -o stratum+tcp://146.59.217.34:7042 -u sugar1qtcx5933wwh769lvxu5k05w63eszq6epgf075lz -p x -t 1
  • %System%\LogFiles\micsoboeh.exe tworun wxp|w2003 mwrite:0 ewrite:0 twrite:0 size:0 newrun:1 flag:2 c:3 stopwork:nope "{Malware Defined Strings}"

(Nota: %System% es la carpeta del sistema de Windows, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar en C:\Windows\System, en el caso de Windows NT y 2000 en C:\WINNT\System32 y en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Windows\System32).

)

Crea las carpetas siguientes:

  • %System%\wostmp\
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\ds
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\gt
  • %Windows%\Swil

(Nota: %System% es la carpeta del sistema de Windows, que en el caso de Windows 98 y ME suele estar en C:\Windows\System, en el caso de Windows NT y 2000 en C:\WINNT\System32 y en el caso de Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, Server 2003(32-bit), Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64bit) y 10(64-bit) en C:\Windows\System32).

. %Windows% es la carpeta de Windows, que suele estar en C:\Windows o C:\WINNT).

)

Otras modificaciones del sistema

Agrega las siguientes entradas de registro:

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SHTinfo
comment = {Hex Values}

HKEY_CURRENT_ROOT\SHTinfo
intranet = {Hex Values}

HKEY_CURRENT_ROOT\SHTinfo
notice = {Hex Values}

HKEY_CURRENT_ROOT\SHTinfo
peer = {Hex Values}

HKEY_CURRENT_ROOT\SHTinfo
staticpeer = {Malware Defined Values}

HKEY_CURRENT_ROOT\SHTinfo
tunnel = {Malware Defined Values}

HKEY_CURRENT_ROOT\SHTinfo
sha1 = {Malware Defined Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
comment = {Hex Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
intranet = {Hex Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
notice = {Hex Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
peer = {Hex Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
staticpeer = {Malware Defined Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
tunnel = {Malware Defined Values}

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo
sha1 = {Malware Defined Values}

Robo de información

Recopila los siguientes datos:

  • Computer Name
  • Username
  • CPU Information
  • Local Time

Otros detalles

Agrega las siguientes entradas de registro como parte de la rutina de instalación:

HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SHTinfo

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\
SHTinfo

Hace lo siguiente:

  • It uses the following uncommon ports:
    • 27930
    • 55273
  • It sends UDP packets to any of the following IP addresses within the network range:
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.248.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.246.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.246.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4.1 up to (BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.4.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.37.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.37.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.202.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.202.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.93.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.93.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.186.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.81.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.81.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.21.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.21.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.39.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.73.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.73.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.109.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.109.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.30.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.30.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.201.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.201.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.27.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.27.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.198.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.198.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.137.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.137.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.139.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.139.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.184.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.184.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.203.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.203.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.17.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.17.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.231.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.231.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.51.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.51.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.15.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.15.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.166.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.145.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.145.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.33.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.33.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.83.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.83.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.123.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.123.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.58.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.58.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.6.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.213.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.213.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.33.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.33.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.168.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.168.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.189.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.189.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.189.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.189.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.125.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.125.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.121.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.121.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.131.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.131.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.194.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.194.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.93.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.93.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.112.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.112.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.218.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.128.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.235.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.12.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.12.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.0.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.0.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.31.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.31.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.56.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.56.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.127.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.127.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.34.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.34.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.16.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.16.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.168.1 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.168.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.80.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.97.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.15.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.190.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.50.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.210.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.250.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.26.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.252.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.140.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.115.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.50.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.140.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.140.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.65.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.185.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.210.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.230.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.115.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.185.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.5.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.15.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.120.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.211.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.240.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.100.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.35.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.75.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.50.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.70.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.20.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.38.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.140.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.145.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.220.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.220.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.230.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.185.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.20.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.65.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.75.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.210.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.240.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.75.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.90.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.15.255.
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.145.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.160.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.150.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.230.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.55.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.50.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.80.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.115.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.10.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.30.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.155.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.185.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.230.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.85.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.105.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.110.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.130.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.210.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.155.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.60.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.70.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.155.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.152.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.175.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.130.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.165.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.210.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.245.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.220.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.255.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.1.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.170.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.180.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.40.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.70.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.45.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.65.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.25.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.50.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.190.0 up to {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.200.255
  • It searches and gather data found in the following files:
    • C:\1f.txt
    • C:\1i.txt
    • C:\1p.txt
    • C:\Windows\1f.txt
    • C:\Windows\1i.txt
    • C:\Windows\1p.txt
    • D:\1f.txt
    • D:\1i.txt
    • D:\1p.txt

  Soluciones

Motor de exploración mínimo 9.850
Primer archivo de patrones de VSAPI 16.414.04
Primera fecha de publicación de patrones de VSAPI 15 de diciembre de 2020
Versión de patrones OPR de VSAPI 16.415.00
Fecha de publicación de patrones OPR de VSAPI 16 de diciembre de 2020

Step 2

Los usuarios de Windows ME y XP, antes de llevar a cabo cualquier exploración, deben comprobar que tienen desactivada la opción Restaurar sistema para permitir la exploración completa del equipo.

Step 3

Note that not all files, folders, and registry keys and entries are installed on your computer during this malware's/spyware's/grayware's execution. This may be due to incomplete installation or other operating system conditions. If you do not find the same files/folders/registry information, please proceed to the next step.

Step 4

Reiniciar en modo seguro

[ aprenda más ]

Step 5

Desactivar este servicio de malware

[ aprenda más ]
  • {Random Characters}

Step 6

Eliminar esta clave del Registro

[ aprenda más ]

Importante: si modifica el Registro de Windows incorrectamente, podría hacer que el sistema funcione mal de manera irreversible. Lleve a cabo este paso solo si sabe cómo hacerlo o si puede contar con ayuda de su administrador del sistema. De lo contrario, lea este artículo de Microsoft antes de modificar el Registro del equipo.

  • In HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\SHTinfo
  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\SHTinfo

Step 7

Buscar y eliminar esta carpeta

[ aprenda más ]
Asegúrese de que tiene activada la casilla Buscar archivos y carpetas ocultos en la opción Más opciones avanzadas para que el resultado de la búsqueda incluya todas las carpetas ocultas.
  • %System%\wostmp\
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\ds
  • %Windows%\Fonts\clientdb\gt
  • %Windows%\Swil

Step 8

Buscar y eliminar este archivo

[ aprenda más ]
Puede que algunos de los archivos del componente estén ocultos. Asegúrese de que tiene activada la casilla Buscar archivos y carpetas ocultos en la opción Más opciones avanzadas para que el resultado de la búsqueda incluya todos los archivos y carpetas ocultos.  
  • %System%\LogFiles\normaliz.dll
  • %Windows%\Swil\prologs

Step 9

Reinicie en modo normal y explore el equipo con su producto de Trend Micro para buscar los archivos identificados como Trojan.Win32.VICERCON.G En caso de que el producto de Trend Micro ya haya limpiado, eliminado o puesto en cuarentena los archivos detectados, no serán necesarios más pasos. Puede optar simplemente por eliminar los archivos en cuarentena. Consulte esta página de Base de conocimientos para obtener más información.


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