LokiBot Impersonates Popular Game Launcher
We discovered a LokiBot variant impersonating a popular game launcher to trick users into executing it on their machines. Further analysis revealed it employs a quirky, installation routine that involves dropping a compiled C# code file.
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(By Augusto Remillano II, Mohammed Malubay, and Arvin Roi Macaraeg, Threat Analysts) LokiBot, which has the ability to harvest sensitive data such as passwords as well as cryptocurrency information, proves that the actors behind it is invested in evolving the threat. In the past, we have seen a campaign that exploits a remote code execution vulnerability to deliver LokiBot using the Windows Installer service, a Lokibot variant that uses ISO images, and a variant with an improved persistence mechanism using steganography. Recently, we discovered LokiBot (detected by Trend Micro as Trojan.Win32.LOKI) impersonating a popular game launcher to trick users into executing it on their machines. Further analysis revealed that a sample of this variant employs a quirky, installation routine that involves dropping a compiled C# code file. This unusual LokiBot variant, which uses a “compile after delivery” detection evasion technique, was proactively detected and blocked by machine learning detection capabilities built into Trend Micro solutions as Troj.Win32.TRX.XXPE50FFF034.
The infection starts with a file that is supposedly the installer of the Epic Games store. This fake installer was built using the NSIS (Nullsoft Scriptable Install System) installer authoring tool. In this campaign, the malicious NSIS Windows installer used the logo of Epic Games — the development company behind popular games such as Fortnite — to trick users into thinking that it’s a legitimate installer.
Figure 1. File icon of the LokiBot malware installer under the guise of a game installer
Figure 2. Screenshot of installer script
Figure 3. Screenshot showing the main function of the dropped .NET executable
Figure 4. Screenshot of code snippet that shows a portion of the junk code that can be found in the binary (top part), as well as code that shows how the dropped C# code file is read and compiled (bottom part)
After compiling the C# code file, the binary would call the EventLevel function present in the C# code file using the InvokeMember function. The called function would decrypt and load the encrypted assembly code embedded inside it.
Figure 5. Screenshot of code showing the binary calling the EventLevel() function
Figure 6. Code snippet that shows how the assembly code would be decrypted This LokiBot sample’s installation routine combines two techniques to evade detection: First, it makes use of a C# source code to evade defense mechanisms that solely target executable binaries. In addition, it also uses obfuscated files in the form of the encrypted assembly code embedded in the C# code file. The final phase of the infection would be the execution of the LokiBot payload. Consistently among the most active infostealers in the wild, these tweaks to its installation and obfuscation mechanisms indicate that LokiBot is not about to slow down in the near future.
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|SHA-256||File Type||Detection Name|
|385bbd6916c88636a1a4f6a659cf3ce647777212ebc82f0c9a82dc4aea6b7c06||Encrypted Assembly Code|